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INTRODUCTION
OVER THE LAST SEVERAL DECADES, COMMUNICATION technologies have prolifer-
ated' and the privacy protection afforded to newly emerging types of communica-
tion is uncertain.2 Courts have demonstrated reluctance to apply traditional Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence to new communication technologies' and statutory
protections have not clarified the matter.4 Undoubtedly, the next "frontier in
* J.D., University of Maryland School of Law, May 2009; B.A., Business, University of Maryland, College
Park, May 2006.
1. S. REP. No. 99-541, at *2-3 (1986) (noting "tremendous advances in telecommunications and com-
puter technologies"); Steven S. Wildman, Welcome and Introduction to the Symposium: Second Annual Quello
Telecommunications Policy and Law Symposium, 2001 L. REV. M.S.U.-D.C.L. 217, 217-19 (discussing the "rapid
rate of change in communication technolog[y]" and the ramifications of the rapid adoption of changing tech-
nology on "communication industries, the economy, and society at large").
2. See, e.g., Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008) (noting "[t]he extent
to which the Fourth Amendment provides privacy protection for the contents of electronic communications"
-such as e-mails, text messages and other means of electronic communication-is as yet "an open question");
Orin S. Kerr, The Fourth Amendment and New Technologies: Constitutional Myths and the Case for Caution, 102
MICH. L. REV. 801, 808 (2004) (stating that "no one knows whether an expectation of privacy in a new technol-
ogy is 'reasonable' ").
3. See generally Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967); Tamar R. Gubins, Note, Warshak v. United
States: The Katzfor Electronic Communications, 23 BERKELEY TECH. L.J, 723, 724 (2008) (citing generally Daniel
J. Solove, The Coexistence of Privacy and Security: Fourth Amendment Codification and Professor Kerr's Misguided
Call for Judicial Deference, 74 FORDHAM L. REV. 747, 769 (2005)) (noting that courts have demonstrated reluc-
tance to find Fourth Amendment protection for technologies not covered by congressional acts); Kerr, supra
note 2, at 807-09, (explaining the reluctance of judges to apply the traditional approach which requires consid-
eration of "the importance of privacy" in the technology, "the meaning of 'reasonableness'" and ultimately a
normative assessment of whether privacy should exist in the technology).
See also Stephanie Gore, "A Rose by Any Other Name": Judicial Use of Metaphors for New Technologies, 2003
J.L. TECH. & POL'Y 403, 408, 415 (noting that a significant number of Americans are "technophobic" and
reasoning that if judges are similar to the vast number of Americans, they may be more willing to accept
metaphors and analogies for new technologies rather than undertaking the task of understanding whether the
metaphors and analogies fit the particular legal question before them); Susan Freiwald, First Principles of Com-
munications Privacy, 2007 STAN. TECH. L. REV. 3, 8 (stating that courts generally avoid or cut short "reasona-
ble expectation of privacy analysis for modern communication because the analysis pushes [judges] beyond
their (judicial) competence").
4. See, e.g., Fraser v. Nationwide Mut. Ins. Co., 135 F. Supp. 2d 623, 633 (E.D. Pa. 2001) (stating that the
Electronic Communications Privacy Act ("ECPA") is known for its "lack of clarity"), affd in part, vacated in
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Fourth Amendment jurisprudence" will be in determining privacy rights of users of
these new modes of communication.'
As users of new communication technologies raise constitutional challenges to
government searches and seizures of their e-mails,6 cell-phone calls,7 text messages, s
voice-mail messages, and voice-over-internet protocol (VolP) communications,"
courts must address whether the users of such services possess a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in these communication mediums requiring the government to
obtain a probable cause warrant prior to search or seizure.' Faced with the daunt-
ing prospect of determining what privacy rights exist in the new frontier, some
courts have failed to thoroughly analyze new technologies under the traditional
Katz v. United States" framework."2 Instead, courts have taken refuge in the famil-
part, remanded by 352 F.3d 107 (3d Cir. 2004). Courts and academia have grappled with defining the relation-
ship between the Wiretap Act (Tide I) and the Stored Communications Act (Title 11). Id.; see Electronic Com-
munications Privacy Act, 18 U.S.C. §§ 2701-2712 (2006).
5. Quon, 529 F.3d at 904 (commenting that the application of the Fourth Circuit president to electronic
communication remains a frontier that has been little explored).
6. See Warshak v. United States, No. 1:06-CV-357, 2006 WL 5230332, at *1 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006),
affd in part, modified in part, 490 F.3d 455 (6th Cir. 2007), reh'ggranted en banc, No. 06-4092, 2007 U.S. App.
LEXIS 23741 (6th Cir. Oct 9, 2007), rev'd en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008); see also United States v.
Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 416 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (determining "whether appellant has established a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the AOL e-mail system").
7. See, e.g., Price v. Turner, 260 F.3d 1144, 1149 (9th Cir. 2001) (holding that the interception of"cordless
telephone communications" did not violate the Wiretap Act); United States v. McNulty (In re Askin), 47 F.3d at
100, 101, 106 (4th Cir. 1995) (holding that government interception of communications via cordless phone did
not violate the Fourth Amendment); Tyler v. Berodt, 877 F.2d 705, 705-07 (8th Cir. 1989) (holding that a
neighbor's interception of the plaintiff's cordless phone calls is not a Fourth Amendment violation); United
States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1246-47 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding no reasonable expectation of privacy in Hoffa's
cellular telephone calls "which were exposed to everyone in that area who possessed a F.M. radio receiver"). But
see United States v. Smith, 978 F.2d 171, 180 (5th Cir. 1992) (concluding that as cell phone technology becomes
more advanced and the calls become more difficult to intercept, interception may become a Fourth Amend-
ment violation as it would be more reasonable to expect privacy).
8. Quon, 529 F.3d at 895.
9. See Daniel B. Garrie et al., Voice Over Internet Protocol and the Wiretap Act: Is Your Conversation
Protected?, 29 SEATTLE U. L. REV. 97, 97 (2005) (noting that the privacy rights assigned to data and voice have
been combined with the advent of VoIP communications such that the once clear distinction between pro-
tected voice communications and unprotected data communications is now uncertain); James M. O'Neil, The
Impact of VoIP Technology on Fourth Amendment Protections Against Electronic Surveillance, 12 INTELL. PROP. L.
BULL. 35, 42 (2007) (explaining that VoIP communications as they occur are protected by the Wiretap Act, but
concluding that the status of stored VoIP communications remains unclear).
10. See Stephan K. Bayens, The Search and Seizure of Computers: Are We Sacrificing Personal Privacy for the
Advancement of Technology?, 48 DRAKE L. REV. 239, 241 (2000) (citing Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347,
350-52, 360 (1967)). "[Tlhe constitutional protections embodied in the Fourth Amendment are only triggered
upon a showing of a reasonable expectation of privacy." Id.; see also Horton v. California, 496 U.S. 128, 133 n.4
(1990) (noting that warrantless searches and seizures are presumptively unreasonable under the Fourth
Amendment).
11. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
12. See Freiwald, supra note 3, at 8 (explaining that the "reasonable expectation of privacy" pushes judges
beyond their competence because it requires analysis of societal views about intricate technologies, and the
undertaking of a normative analysis to determine if users should believe such technologies are private); Kerr,
supra note 2, at 850 (explaining that courts confronted with the question of whether surveillance violated the
Fourth Amendment typically rely on the statutory protections of the ECPA and analyze the matter no further).
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iar, analogizing the new communication technology to letters,1 3 post-cards, 4 and
telephone calls.' Because long-established jurisprudence holds that reasonable ex-
pectations of privacy exist in many of these traditional communication networks,
modern courts analogously conclude that the same expectation of privacy therefore
exists in electronic communication networks. 6 However, comparative judicial rea-
soning overlooks important distinctions in the technical operations of electronic
communications networks which act to limit the reasonableness of an expectation
of privacy.' Rather than utilize ill-tailored and ill-suited analogies, Katz must be
applied to determine whether a reasonable expectation of privacy exists in the new
communication networks given the type of information communicated and to
whom that information is conveyed.'
Although the focus of this Comment will be on the judicial tendency to apply
comparative reasoning to different types of mediums, the Comment will primarily
use the example case of e-mail communication to illustrate central points. I first
examine the current Fourth Amendment doctrine. 9 Next, I discuss comparative
reasoning and the judicial tendency to apply comparisons to emerging electronic
communication technologies. 0 I then examine the technical operation of e-mail,
one type of electronic communication technology,2' and discuss the propriety of
comparisons to postal mail or telephone communications given key technological
distinctions between electronic communication networks and traditional commu-
nication networks.22 Given these distinctions, I conduct a Katz analysis and con-
clude that there is generally no reasonable expectation of privacy in electronic
communications.23 Finally, in keeping with a strong judicial commitment to not
allow technological advances to erode privacy protections, I propose that the judici-
ary must act to create an explicit exception to the disclosure principles to develop a
13. See United States v. Jacobsen, 466 U.S. 109, 114 (1984) (finding that an individual has an expectation
of privacy in sealed packages and letters such that they are entitled to presume U.S. postal service mail carriers
or other government agents cannot open the items without obtaining a warrant); Exparte Jackson, 96 U.S. 727,
733 (1877) ("Letters and sealed packages ... are as fully guarded from examination and inspection ... as if they
were retained by the parties forwarding them in their own domiciles.").
14. See United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S. 249, 251 (1970) (citing Jackson, 96 U.S. at 733) (distin-
guishing protected sealed letters and packages whose contents are shielded from post cards, circulars or other
printed matter sent through the mail which are unprotected).
15. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353 (finding that a Fourth Amendment expectation of privacy in telephone calls
made from a closed telephone booth was violated when the government installed a listening device outside the
telephone booth).
16. See infra Part II.B.
17. See infra Part III.B.
18. See infra Part IV.
19. See infra Part I.
20. See infra Part II.
21. See infra Part I1.
22. See infra Part III.; Freiwald, supra note 3, at 7 (discussing how significant differences between tele-
phone and electronic communications makes a straightforward analogy between the networks impractical).
23. See infra Part IV.; Freiwald, supra note 3, at 7 (concluding that in light of the technical differences
between communication networks, courts must apply the Katz test anew).
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clear doctrine for the development of privacy protections in the new frontier of
electronic communications.24
I. FOURTH AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE
The Fourth Amendment to the Constitution provides the individual with the right
"to be secure in their persons, houses, papers, and effects, against unreasonable
searches and seizures" unless a warrant is issued "upon probable cause, supported
by Oath or affirmation, and particularly describing the place to be searched, and
the persons or things to be seized."2 The Supreme Court has narrowed the scope of
permissible warrantless "search and seizure" from a broad class under a strict tex-
tual construction of the Amendment to a substantially narrower category limited to
areas in which an individual does not have a "reasonable expectation of privacy."26
Since settling on the broad "reasonable expectation of privacy test" enunciated in
Katz,27 the Court has continuously chiseled away at the scope of the Amendment's
protection through doctrines limiting the reasonableness of an expectation of
privacy."
A. Pre-Katz: Trespass Theory and the Development of Fourth Amendment
Doctrine
The Supreme Court's early Fourth Amendment doctrine strictly construed the text
of the amendment to protect only against the government's physical trespasses onto
the citizen's property, the warrantless search of tangible personal property, or the
warrantless seizure of the person.29 This interpretation provided scant protection to
citizens, protecting only against physical trespasses onto constitutionally protected
spaces, such as the home or curtilage, and seizure of the person or their tangible
property such as "papers . . . and effects.""
24. See infra Part V.
25. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
26. See generally Robert S. Steere, Note, Keeping "Private E-Mail" Private: A Proposal to Modify the Elec-
tronic Communications Privacy Act, 33 VAL. U. L. REV. 231, 236-43 (1998) (summarizing the development of
modern Fourth Amendment doctrine).
27. Stephen P. Jones, Reasonable Expectations of Privacy: Searches, Seizures, and the Concept of Fourth
Amendment Standing, 27 U. MEM. L. REV. 907, 914 (1997) (explaining that the Katz Court adopted a broad test
that allows the Amendment to adapt).
28. See infra Part II.B.1.; Deirdre K. Mulligan, Reasonable Expectations in Electronic Communications: A
Critical Perspective on the Electronic Communications Privacy Act, 72 GEo. WASH. L. REV. 1557, 1576-82 (2004)
(noting that subsequent application of the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy" test quickly undermined its
initial promise by limiting the doctrine through the business records cases).
29. Thomas K. Clancy, What is a "Search" Within the Meaning of the Fourth Amendment, 70 ALB. L. REv. 1,
17 (2006) (examining the literal approach taken by the Supreme Court in Olmstead v. United States and
describing the development of Fourth Amendment doctrine).
30. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 466 (1928), overruled in part by Katz v. United States, 389
U.S. 347 (1967), and Berger v. New York, 358 U.S. 41 (1967).
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Olmstead v. United States3' epitomizes the Supreme Court's early Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence. Olmstead examined the government's wiretap of Olmstead's
telephone line from a neighboring building without any physical trespass onto
Olmstead's property. 2 The majority reasoned that none of the Supreme Court's
previous cases held that the Fourth Amendment was violated unless there was a
physical search of the person, a seizure of his tangible effects, or an actual physical
invasion of a protected area.3 Consequently, the majority concluded that the wire-
tap was not a search under the Fourth Amendment for two primary reasons: 1)
there was no physical invasion of a constitutionally protected area as there was no
physical trespass onto Olmstead's real property and 2) there was no search of a
tangible item as the wiretap searched only intangible sound. 4
Justice Brandeis's dissent in Olmstead rejected the Court's "unduly literal con-
struction" and narrow-minded view of the Fourth Amendment. Justice Brandeis
argued that the interpretation of the Amendment should be flexible, adapting to
new means of surveillance and new means of government intrusion; methods
which he argued could not be predicted by the Framers nor anticipated by the
majority.36 Justice Brandeis cautioned the Court that it was their duty to develop
the Amendment in such a way as to protect against, not only means of government
intrusion then known, but also "what may be" in the future.37 Justice Brandeis
reasoned that the science of government intrusion and espionage into the private
lives of its citizens would not stop with the advent of wiretapping,3" but rather
would advance beyond invasions of tangible spaces such that the government could
reproduce evidence in a Court of the "the most intimate occurrences of the home"
without even "removing papers from secret drawers."39
B. Broader Fourth Amendment Protection: Katz and the "Reasonable" Expectation
of Privacy Test
Justice Brandeis's flexible interpretation of the Fourth Amendment ultimately won
out over the Olmstead majority's strict textual interpretation after Olmstead was
31. 277 U.S. 438. In Olmstead, the appellant, Roy Olmstead, sought to suppress, as a constitutionally
impermissible search, recordings of conversations obtained by the police after a lengthy months-long wiretap of
his home and office telephone line. Id. at 455.
32. Id. at 456-57.
33. Id. at 466.
34. Id. at 464 ("There was no searching. There was no seizure. The evidence was secured by the use of the
sense of hearing and that only. There was no entry of the houses or offices of the defendants.").
35. Id. at 476 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
36. See id. at 478; Steere, supra note 26, at 239-40.
37. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
38. Id. at 474-75. See Patricia K. Holmes, Comment, FBI's Carnivore: Is the Government Eating Away Our
Right of Privacy?, 7 ROGER WILLIAMS U. L. REV. 247 (2001) for a modern reflection on Justice Brandeis's
prediction. Carnivore is an electronic surveillance device developed by the FBI. Id. at 249.
39. Olmstead, 277 U.S. at 474 (Brandeis, J., dissenting).
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officially discredited by the watershed decision of Katz v. United States.40 Katz has
since become the keystone of modern Fourth Amendment law."
In Katz, the Court held that the government's use of an external listening device
from outside a public telephone booth to record Katz's telephone conversation
amounted to a search in violation of the Fourth Amendment." The Court deter-
mined that the telephone user maintained a reasonable expectation of privacy such
that, upon entering the public telephone booth and closing the door, he was "surely
entitled to assume that the words he utter[ed] ... [would] not be broadcast to the
world."43 The Katz majority reasoned that a more narrow interpretation of the pro-
tections afforded to a telephone user by the Fourth Amendment would ignore the
vital role the telephone had come to play in private communications in modern
American life."
Consequently, the Katz Court rejected the strict interpretation afforded the
Fourth Amendment in Olmstead, noting that the Supreme Court had departed in
previous decisions from its strict textual interpretation of the Amendment4" and
expressly held that the government's activities in electronically eavesdropping and
recording Katz's conversation violated the privacy upon which he "justifiably re-
lied" in violation of the Fourth Amendment.4" Katz therefore made clear that a
Fourth Amendment violation is not dependent on a physical trespass onto a consti-
tutionally protected space,47 but rather is controlled by whether the government has
violated an individual's expectation of privacy which the individual was justified in
relying upon.48
40. 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967) ("[T]he premise that property interests control the right of the Government
to search and seize has been discredited." (quoting Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967))).
41. See, e.g., Anthony G. Amsterdam, Perspectives on the Fourth Amendment, 58 MINN. L. REV. 349, 382
(1974) (hailing Katz as a "watershed" in Fourth Amendment law); William G. Traynor, Recent Developments,
Constitutional Law-Search and Seizure- Warrantless Aerial Surveillance, California v. Ciraolo, 106 S. Ct. 1809
(1986), 54 TENN. L. REV. 131, 135 (1986) (calling Katz the "keystone" of modern fourth amendment law).
42. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 353. In Katz, the appellant was convicted of violating a federal statute prohibiting
wagering by telephone. Id. at 348. The government introduced evidence against the appellant including tele-
phone conversations recorded by the FBI using an electronic listening device placed outside of the public
telephone booth from which he placed his calls. Id. Katz challenged the validity of the government's actions
recording his telephone conversations without a search warrant. Id. at 349-50.
43. Id. at 352.
44. Id.
45. See id. at 352-53 (reasoning "that the underpinnings of Olmstead and Goldman have been so eroded by
our subsequent decisions that the 'trespass' doctrine there enunciated can no longer be regarded as control-
ling"). The Katz majority cited Warden v. Hayden, 387 U.S. 294, 304 (1967) when discrediting Olmstead, con-
tending that Warden had rejected the premise that property interests control Fourth Amendment application.
Id.; Kerr, supra note 2, at 818 (noting that the Katz Court did not cite Justice Brandeis's dissent in discrediting
Olmstead).
46. Katz, 389 U.S. at 353.
47. Id. "[Tihe Fourth Amendment protects people--and not simply 'areas'-against unreasonable
searches and seizures . "Id.
48. Id.
The Government's activities in electronically listening to and recording the petitioner's words vio-
lated the privacy upon which he justifiably relied while using the telephone booth and thus consti-
JOURNAL OF BUSINESS & TECHNOLOGY LAW
AMANDA YELLON
While the majority's opinion held that Katz had a justifiable expectation of pri-
vacy, it was Justice Harlan's concurrence that set out the two-fold analysis now
synonymous with Katz.49 Harlan clarified the Supreme Court's holding, explaining
that an individual has a justifiable or reasonable expectation of privacy where the
individual has 1) "exhibited an actual (subjective) expectation of privacy;" and 2)
where society is prepared to recognize the individual's expectation as objectively
reasonable." Both elements must be present in order for the protections of the
Fourth Amendment to apply."' Harlan concluded that both prongs were met in
Katz because the society recognized the public telephone booth as a place where an
occupant's expectation of privacy was reasonable, and Katz subjectively acted to
preserve his right to privacy by shutting the telephone booth door behind him. 2
In Kyllo v. United States," the Supreme Court reaffirmed its commitment to
adapting to society's expectations of privacy, recognizing that technological ad-
vances cannot be allowed to whittle away at society's expectation of privacy as
against the government.5 4 Kyllo required the Court to consider an investigator's use
of a thermal imaging device to measure whether the amount of heat emanating
from a home was consistent with the amount of heat required to grow marijuana
indoors.5 The Kyllo Court expressed its belief that an impermissible search occurs
when sense enhancing technology not in general public use is used by the govern-
ment to intrude upon the home and the government is therefore able to obtain
information that it otherwise could not have obtained without a physical intru-
sion. 6 In dicta, the Court noted that its decision sought to preserve the degree of
privacy against the government that existed when the Framers adopted the Fourth
tuted a 'search and seizure' within the meaning of the Fourth Amendment. The fact that the
electronic device employed to achieve that end did not happen to penetrate the wall of the booth can
have no constitutional significance.
Id.
49. See Kerr, supra note 2, at 822 & n.113 (discussing Justice Harlan's understanding of the "expectation of
privacy" framework).
50. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring). Justice Harlan offered an example of the application of
this two-fold analysis, identifying the home as an area where society has recognized an individual's expectation
of privacy as objectively reasonable, but noted that an individual has not conducted himself in a manner
consistent with an actual expectation of privacy if he engages in activities inside the home in "plain view" of the
public. Id.
51. See Cecil J. Hunt, II, Calling in the Dogs: Suspicionless Sniff Searches and Reasonable Expectations of
Privacy, 56 CASE W. REs. L. REV. 285, 313 (2005) (explaining that the expectation of privacy test consists of
two inquiries and both must be satisfied to qualify for Fourth Amendment protection).
52. Katz, 389 U.S. at 361 (Harlan, J., concurring).
53. 533 U.S. 27 (2001).
54. Id. at 34.
55. Id. at 29. The Ninth Circuit had held that Kyllo possessed "no subjective expectation of privacy because
he had made no attempt to conceal the heat escaping from his home, and even if he had, there was no
objectively reasonable expectation of privacy because the imager 'did not expose any intimate details of Kyllo's
life,' only 'amorphous "hot spots" on the roof and exterior wall."' Id. at 31 (citations omitted).
56. Id. at 34-35.
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Amendment. 7 Permitting this intrusion, the Court stated, would permit "technol-
ogy to erode the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment."58
Since settling on the Katz "reasonable expectation of privacy test," the Court has
whittled away at the scope of the Amendment's protection.59 The Court's Fourth
Amendment jurisprudence since Katz reasons that disclosure of information to
third parties makes an expectation of privacy objectively unreasonable' and that a
user's expectation of privacy is unreasonable if the user has agreed to terms of
service granting a third party access to the communication,6"
1. Limiting Reasonableness: Assumption of the Risk and Third Party Doctrine
Two doctrines which limit the "reasonableness" of an expectation of privacy are
assumption of the risk and the third party doctrine.62 Katz itself cautioned that
information "knowingly expose[d] to the public" would not be entitled to Fourth
Amendment protection.63 Indeed, a well settled Fourth Amendment principle is
that where an individual reveals private information to another, he assumes the
risk that the information will be revealed by the other to the government.64 Thus,
the primary circumstance where an individual forfeits his Fourth Amendment pro-
tection is where the individual "knowingly exposes" the information to a third
party or the general public.6"
No Fourth Amendment protection exists for information disclosed to the gen-
eral public.66 In Oliver v. United States,67 the Court found no Fourth Amendment
protection where narcotics agents, acting on reports of a marijuana growing opera-
57. Id. at 34.
58. Id.
59. See infra Parts I.B.1-2.; see also Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1577-82 (noting that the subsequent
application of the Katz reasonable expectation of privacy test quickly undermined its initial broad promise by
limiting the doctrine through the business records cases).
60. See Andrew J. DeFilippis, Securing Informationships: Recognizing a Right to Privity in Fourth Amend-
ment jurisprudence, 115 YALE L.J. 1086, 1099 (2006) (explaining that the Court's decision in United States v.
Miller was the first enunciation of the third party doctrine). Under this "third party doctrine" the Court has
generally held that a user's expectation of privacy is objectively unreasonable where the user has disclosed
information to a third party. Id.; see also infra Part I.B.l.
61. See infra Part I.B.2.
62. See DeFilippis, supra note 60, at 1100 (explaining that Miller, Smith, and their progeny rely on both the
third party doctrine and a closely related doctrine of assumption of the risk). Assumption of the risk was first
articulated in Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293 (1966), decided a year before Katz. Id.
63. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 351 (1967).
64. Matthew D. Lawless, Comment, The Third Party Doctrine Redux: Internet Search Records and the Case
for a "Crazy Quilt" ofFourth Amendment Protection, 2007 UCLA J.L. & TECH. 1, 7; Daniel J. Solove, A Taxonomy
of Privacy, 154 U. PA. L. REV. 477, 528 (2006); see also Stephen E. Henderson, Nothing New Under the Sun? A
Technologically Rational Doctrine of Fourth Amendment Search, 56 MERCER L. REV. 507, 518-19 (2005).
65. See Katz, 389 U.S. at 351; see also Lawless, supra note 64, at 7; Solove, supra note 64, at 528; Henderson,
supra note 64, at 518 (explaining the development of the third party doctrine).
66. See, e.g., Katz, 389 U.S. at 351 (stating that "[w]hat a person knowingly exposes to the public, even in
his own home or office, is not a subject of Fourth Amendment protection").
67. 466 U.S. 170 (1984).
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tion, went to the defendant's farm and saw a field of marijuana growing on the
defendant's farm.6" The Court reasoned that open fields are not an area protected
by the Fourth Amendment because fences and "no trespassing" signs fail to bar the
public from freely viewing open fields.69 Thus, the Court found that the defendant
had no reasonable expectation of privacy because he knowingly exposed his illegal
operation to the public.7"
Similarly, there is no Fourth Amendment protection where a communication is
made to another because the communicator has "assumed the risk" the confidant
will provide the information to the government.7' This assumption of the risk doc-
trine was clearly articulated in Hoffa v. United States.72 In Hoffa, the Supreme Court
held that a defendant was not entitled to Fourth Amendment protection for state-
ments made by Hoffa to a government informant.73 The Court reasoned that Hoffa
had assumed the risk that any information gained by the informant would be
shared with the authorities.74 In so holding, the Supreme Court crystallized the
doctrine that the Fourth Amendment does not protect the content of the conversa-
tion of a speaker against the misplaced trust of his confidant because the recipient
can be compelled by subpoena to testify. 75 In United States v. White,76 the Court
considered whether the government could be prohibited from obtaining informa-
tion revealed by White to an undercover narcotics informant wearing a radio trans-
mitter77 where the suspect had made the disclosure on the assumption that the
recipient would use the information for a limited purpose and the recipient was in
a position of trust and confidence.7" The majority opinion reasoned that White did
not have a valid Fourth Amendment claim because, although White must have had
a subjective expectation that his conversation was private, his expectation was not
objectively reasonable as "one contemplating illegal activities must realize and risk
that his companions may be reporting to the police."79 Thus, the content of com-
munications are not protected where the communicator has revealed content to the
68. See id. at 179 (finding no expectation of privacy because fields were open to view by the general
public).
69. Id.
70. See id.
71. See Hoffa v. United States, 385 U.S. 293, 303 (1966) (explaining that there is no violation of the Fourth
Amendment where a government informant obtains incriminatory statements in a conversation with the de-
fendant because the risk that a friend will reveal that information to the government is "the kind of risk we
necessarily assume whenever we speak" (quoting Lopez v. United States, 373 U.S. 427, 465 (1963))).
72. 385 U.S. 293. See DeFilippis, supra note 60, at 1100-01.
73. Hoffa, 385 U.S. at 302-03.
74. id.
75. Id. at 302.
76. 401 U.S. 745 (1971).
77. Id. at 746-47.
78. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 443 (1976) (citing White, 401 U.S. at 752).
79. White, 401 U.S. at 752.
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"general public" or has assumed the risk that his confidant may be compelled to
testify.80
In the same way, if a communication is made in such a way that a member of the
general public can access the content of the communication, there is no Fourth
Amendment protection in the communication." For example, federal courts ex-
amined whether a Fourth Amendment reasonable expectation of privacy existed in
the content of cellular telephone communications in United States v. Hoffa.8 2 In
Hoffa, the United States Court of appeals for the Seventh Circuit relied on the
broad statement in Katz that information "knowingly expose[d] to the public"
would not be protected by the Fourth Amendment in finding Hoffa possessed no
reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of the calls he placed from his
cellular telephone as the calls "were exposed to everyone in that area who possessed
a F.M. radio receiver or another automobile telephone tuned in to the same
channel."83
Governed by the same disclosure principles, the Supreme Court's combined
precedents in United States v. Miller4 and Smith v. Maryland"s recognize that an
individual has no reasonable expectation of privacy if he has disclosed non-content
information to a party who maintains the information in a record kept in the
ordinary course of business for a legitimate business purpose. 6 In Miller, the Su-
preme Court examined whether the government had illegally seized, pursuant to a
defective subpoena, the financial records of a bank depositor including deposit
slips, statements, checks, and other account information. The Court concluded
that the government had not intruded upon any area in which there was a Fourth
Amendment interest because the bank customer had no reasonable expectation of
privacy in financial records which were not his private papers, but rather were
business records of the bank. 8 The Supreme Court concluded that Miller's records
were not "private papers" within the purview of Fourth Amendment because he
80. See supra notes 66-79 and accompanying text.
81. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 361 (1967) (Harlan, J., concurring) (stating that "conversations
in the open would not be protected against being overheard, for the expectation of privacy under the circum-
stances would be unreasonable"); United States v. McLeod, 493 F.2d 1186, 1188 (7th Cir. 1974) (holding that
no reasonable expectation of privacy existed where federal agents overheard McLeod discussing illegal wagering
when such statements were made in the open and were audible to the agents). See generally United States v.
Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970) (finding no expectation of privacy in mobile telephone communications
that can be monitored by the general public using ordinary F.M. radio receivers).
82. 436 F.2d 1243.
83. id. at 1247.
84. 425 U.S. 435 (1976).
85. 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
86. See infra notes 87-95 and accompanying text; Lawless, supra note 64, at 1, 10 (explaining that Miller
and Smith formalized the Fourth Amendment doctrine stating that the "Amendment does not prohibit the
government from obtaining information revealed to a third party" (citing Smith, 442 U.S. at 734-35)).
87. 425 U.S. at 436-37.
88. Id. at 440.
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could not assert ownership or possession of his bank's records.8 9 The Court relied
on its line of cases regarding misplaced trust and compelled disclosure to reason
that Miller had "assumed the risk," by revealing his financial records to a third
party-the bank-and therefore this information could be conveyed by the bank to
government."
Similarly, in Smith the Court considered whether an individual's Fourth Amend-
ment rights were violated by the government's use of a pen register to capture the
telephone numbers dialed from an individual's home telephone." The Court held
that an individual had relinquished his legitimate expectation to privacy in the
telephone number dialed because he knowingly disclosed the numeric digits dialed
to the telephone company.92 The Court determined that Smith failed to behave in a
manner consistent with an expectation of privacy in the numbers dialed because
Smith knew the digits must be conveyed to the telephone company to direct the
call." Specifically, the Court reasoned that the numeric information was not enti-
tled to an expectation of privacy because the user knowingly conveyed the informa-
tion to the company in order to make the call, knew that the phone company had
facilities to record this information, and knew that the company recorded the in-
formation to fulfill a variety of legitimate business purposes.94 The Court distin-
guished Smith from Katz because Katz involved the government's acquisition of the
contents of communication, while the pen register at issue in Smith merely cap-
tured non-content information-the numeric digits dialed.95
2. Limiting Reasonableness: Contractual Relinquishment
Another circumstance where the expectation of privacy announced in Katz is lim-
ited is when an individual has relinquished the expectation of privacy contractu-
ally, by agreeing to terms or conditions that communications may be monitored, or
audited.96 Such relinquishment means the individual cannot reasonably maintain a
legitimate expectation of privacy.97 Primarily, this topic has been addressed in the
context of computer and electronic communications by federal courts struggling to
89. Id.
90. Id. at 443.
91. Smith, 442 U.S. at 736-38.
92. Id. at 743-44.
93. Id. at 743.
94. Id. at 745 (discussing the ability of telephone companies to record the numbers dialed for legitimate
billing purposes).
95. Id. at 741 (explaining that a pen register is distinguishable from a listening device, such as the device
utilized in Katz, because a pen register is designed such that it cannot capture the contents of the
communication).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000) (holding that a federal employee
possessed no legitimate expectation of privacy where his government employer's policy stated that internet use
would be "auditted], inspect[ed], and/or monitor[ed]"); see also Robert I. Webber, Note, The Privacy of Elec-
tronic Communications: A First Step in the Right Direction, 1 IL. & TECH. 115, 129 (1986) (explaining that a
subjective expectation of privacy may be altered by contract).
97. See Webber, supra note 96, at 129.
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apply Katz where a user has accepted contractual terms with their ISP, employer or
other third party regarding privacy in electronic communications." For example, if
a user has consented to a contractual policy which grants the network administra-
tor or employer unlimited access to a user's computer, the user has extinguished
any subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy." Similarly, if the system con-
tains a disclaimer stating that personal communications are not private, the dis-
claimer will defeat claims of Fourth Amendment protection"
In United States v. Simons, the United States Court of Appeals for the Fourth
Circuit held that a government employee had no reasonable expectation of privacy
in files on an office computer because the government employer had reserved the
right to "audit, inspect, and/or monitor" such files." 1 The court reasoned that the
employee lacked any subjective expectation of privacy in the files downloaded from
the Internet in light of the employer's Internet policy."2 Similarly, in Muick v.
Glenayre Electronics,"' the United States Court of Appeals for the Seventh Circuit
found that an employer's notice that it could inspect employee laptops rendered
illegitimate any expectation of privacy the employee may have had in the
computer."'4
However, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit came to the
opposite result when it considered the expectation of privacy of a college student in
files stored on his personal computer attached to the university network."' 5 In
United States v. Heckenkamp, the government did not challenge that Heckenkamp
had a subjectively reasonable expectation of privacy in his computer and dormitory
room, and the court solely addressed whether Heckenkamp's expectation of privacy
98. See, e.g., United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142 (9th Cir. 2007) (examining a college student's
expectation of privacy in files downloaded off the university network where the university did not have a
monitoring policy); Guest v. Leis, 255 F.3d 325, 333 (6th Cir. 2001) (explaining that a system operator's post-
ing of a disclaimer stating that personal communications on a computer bulletin board were not private de-
feated Fourth Amendment claims); Simons, 206 F.3d at 398 (examining a Fourth Amendment claim of a
federal employee after a government employer with a monitoring policy found pornographic materials on his
work computer).
99. Cf Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d at 1147 (concluding that a student is entitled to an expectation of privacy
where the University network policy provided assurances that computer and electronic files would generally be
free from access by anyone other than the authorized users and made limited exceptions to maintain network
operations).
100. See Guest, 255 F.3d at 333 (citing Simons, 206 F.3d at 398) (finding that a user lacks a privacy interest
in his internet search records where his/her employer has posted a privacy disclaimer regarding computer files).
101. Simons, 206 F.3d at 398. The Court held that the employee did not have a objectively reasonable
expectation of privacy in internet search records made from his workplace computer in view of the employer's
computer usage policy. Id. The policy specified the types of data that would be monitored, including e-mail,
Internet, and electronic file transfers, and specified the ways in which the data would be retrieved, including
audit and inspection. Id.
102. Id.; see also Michelle Hess, Note, What's Left of the Fourth Amendment in the Workplace: Is the Standard
of Reasonable Suspicion Sufficiently Protecting Your Rights?, 15 FED. CIRCUIT B.. 255, 274 (2005).
103. 280 F.3d 741 (7th Cir. 2002).
104. Id. at 743.
105. United States v. Heckenkemp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1143-46 (9th Cir. 2007).
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in his computer was objectively reasonable."°6 The court concluded that his expec-
tation of privacy was objectively reasonable because there was no announced moni-
toring policy on the university's computer network."°7 In dicta, the Heckenkamp
court cautioned, however, that privacy expectations would be reduced if the user
was advised that information transmitted through the network is not confidential
and that the systems administrators may monitor communications.'"
II. THE USE OF COMPARISON
The question of what reasonable expectations of privacy exist in new communica-
tions technologies and whether the privacy guaranteed by the Fourth Amendment
will protect users of these systems remains open. 1°9 Courts addressing the issue
have applied comparative reasoning to find reasonable expectations of privacy in
new communications.'' 0
A. The Role of Comparison
Comparison is one of the central tools used to organize thought."' Legal reasoning
is prone to the use of metaphors" 2 and analogy,"' as seen by the great reliance in
the American legal system on the role of precedent in the judicial process." 4 Legal
decisions often "hinge[] on the [persuasive] use of metaphors [and analogies],
which have a unique power to color the court's analysis.""'
When judges are faced with new technologies, specifically in areas of first im-
pression, they are particularly prone to relying on metaphorical or analogical rea-
soning."6 Reliance on such reasoning, rather than undertaking to gain a true
understanding of the technology at issue, creates the potential that an "easy" com-
106. Id. at 1146.
107. Id. at 1147.
108. Id.
109. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 904 (9th Cir. 2008) ("The extent to which the
Fourth Amendment provides protection for the contents of electronic communications in the Internet age is an
open question.").
110. See infra Part lI.B.
111. See Gore, supra note 3, at 403 (noting that it is well established in both cognitive sciences and linguis-
tics that metaphors are one of the primary tools individuals use to organize thought).
112. A metaphor is "a figure of speech in which a word or phrase literally denoting one kind of object or
idea is used in place of another to suggest a likeness or analogy between them . MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S
COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 780 (1lth ed. 2005).
113. An analogy is an "inference that if two or more things agree with one another in some respects they
will problably] agree in others[.]" MERRIAM-WEBSTER'S COLLEGIATE DICTIONARY 44 (1 1th ed. 2005).
114. See Gore, supra note 3, at 405.
115. Gustavo Enrique Schneider, Warshak v. United States: Fourth Amendment Risk Analysis in the 21st
Century, 48 JURIMETRICS 357, 360 (2007) (citing Daniel J. Solove, Privacy and Power: Computer Databases and
Metaphors for Informational Privacy, 53 STAN. L. REV. 1393 (2001)).
116. Jonathan H. Blavin, & I. Glenn Cohen, Note, Gore, Gibson, and Goldsmith: The Evolution of Internet
Metaphors in Law and Commentary, 16 HARV. J.L. & TECH. 265, 267 (2002); Gore, supra note 3, at 409.
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parison will be adopted by the court despite that it is often ill-tailored to the partic-
ular task at issue. 1 7
Thus, one of the pitfalls of comparaiive reasoning is its seductiveness, which
allows a person to take refuge in familiar patterns of reasoning and blinds a person
to dissimilar or inconsistent qualities which favor a different conclusion."8 The use
of metaphorical reasoning in cases dealing with emerging technologies is epito-
mized by the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces opinion in
United States v. Maxwell." 9
B. Using Comparison in Determining Expectations of Privacy
In Maxwell, the FBI obtained a search warrant to search AOL's master list of users
in order to ascertain the identity of a screen name holder 2 ° who had sent e-mails
containing child pornography on the AOL system.' 2' Upon discovering the identity
of the individual involved in sending the e-mails, the agent learned that the screen
name holder, Maxwell, was a member of the U.S. Air Force, and sought a warrant
to search Maxwell's quarters.'22 In the subsequent search of Maxell's computer, the
Air Force obtained numerous images depicting child pornography.'23 After he was
charged, Maxwell sought suppression of the evidence obtained from the FBI's
search of his AOL account and computer."'2 In ruling on the validity of the
searches, the United States Court of Appeals for the Armed Forces first considered
the threshold question of whether Maxwell had "a reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in the AOL e-mail system."'25
The court found that Maxwell had a reasonable expectation of privacy in e-mails
on the AOL system.'26 Rather than examining the underlying subjective and objec-
tive expectations of privacy per the Katz framework, the Maxwell court reasoned
that e-mail was no different than first class mail and telephone calls, both of which
are protected by the Fourth Amendment, and consequently concluded e-mail must
also be protected by the Fourth Amendment.'
First, the court reasoned that e-mail was similar to postal mail, in that "if a
sender of first-class mail seals an envelope and addresses it to another person, the
117. See Gore, supra note 3, at 403.
118. See id.
119. 45 M.J. 406 (C.A.A.F. 1996).
120. Id. at 413.
121. Id. at 412.
122. Id. at 414.
123. Id.
124. Id. at 415. Maxwell contended that the warrant issued by the federal magistrate should be held consti-
tutionally invalid for three reasons; 1) "the typographical error in the warrant authorizing a search of 'RED-
DEL' in place of'Redde 1' [Ready One] invalidates the search of the 'Reddel' files; 2) ... the warrant was overly
broad . . . ; [and] 3) . . . the seizure of the 'Zirloc' materials" was not permissible under the warrant. Id.
125. Id. at 416.
126. Id. at 417.
127. Id. at 417-18.
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sender can reasonably expect the contents to remain private and free from the eyes
of the police absent a search warrant founded upon probable cause. "128 Next, the
court reasoned that e-mail was also similar to telephone communications in that
"the maker of a telephone call has a reasonable expectation that police officials will
not intercept and listen to the conversation; however, the conversation itself is held
with the risk that one of the participants may reveal what is said to others." 29
Reasoning analogously from these parallels, the court stated "the transmitter of an
e-mail message enjoys a reasonable expectation that police officials will not inter-
cept the transmission without probable cause and a search warrant." '' However,
the court cautioned once the transmissions were received by the recipient, the
transmitter would no longer control its destiny.'31
The Maxwell court noted the similarity between e-mail transmissions and tradi-
tional forms of communication, despite the ISP's ability to access the contents of
the e-mail message.'32 Because a sender of a first class piece of mail maintains an
expectation of privacy during the pendency of its receipt by the sender, and be-
cause a telephone user maintains an expectation of privacy during the transmission
of the call, the court explained that an e-mail user whose e-mail is stored on the
AOL system also maintains an expectation of privacy."'
The Maxwell court is not alone in its interpretation of "reasonable" expectations
of privacy in the context of new communications.'34 The United States Court of
Appeals for the Ninth Circuit espoused a similar pattern of reasoning to determine
whether a reasonable expectation of privacy existed in text message communica-
tions.'35 In Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., the Ninth Circuit considered
Quon's 42 U.S.C. § 1983 suit alleging that the city's audit of his text messages on a
work-provided two-way text-enabled device was an unlawful search and seizure in
violation of his Fourth Amendment rights.'36 At the onset, the Quon court ac-
knowledged that the extent to which the Fourth Amendment provides protection
for the contents of electronic communications was "an open question."'37 The court
saw "no meaningful distinction between text messages and letters," reasoning that
text messages, much like letters and e-mails, would not support a reasonable expec-
tation of privacy in the information used to direct a text message to its intended
recipient, in the same way as Smith found no reasonable expectation of privacy in
128. Id. at 417.
129. Id. at 418.
130. Id.
131. Id.
132. Id. at 417-18.
133. See id.
134. See infra notes 135, 141, 150-52 and accompanying text.
135. See Quon v. Arch Wireless Operating Co., 529 F.3d 892, 905 (9th Cir. 2008).
136. Id. at 899.
137. Id. at 904.
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the number dialed to send a telephone call. 3 However, without further analysis,
the court concluded, "users do have a reasonable expectation in the content of their
text messages vis-a-vis the service provider."'39 In this way, the court implicitly
reasoned that the content information contained in a text message was necessarily
analogous to, and entitled to the same protection as, the content information of a
telephone call. 40
Likewise, in Warshak v. United States,' 4' the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Ohio considered the grant of a preliminary injunction
preventing the government from seizing Warshak's e-mails from his ISP.'42 The
court considered metaphors offered by each side. Warshak argued that his e-mail
was a "closed package,"' "container,"""' "letter' 45 that could not be searched with-
out a probable cause search warrant.'46 The United States argued that letters and e-
mails were fundamentally different and the privacy expectation in letters entrusted
to third party mail carriers was different than the privacy expectation in e-mails
entrusted to commercial ISPs. 147 Instead, the government contended that e-mails
entrusted to commercial ISPs were like "postcards,' 4 8 as ISPs contractually reserve
and exercise rights to open, delete, monitor, scan, and otherwise access account
subscriber's e-mails. 49 The district court was ultimately persuaded that Warshak's
metaphor was more appropriate,5 ° and concluded that Warshak was likely to suc-
138. Id. at 905.
139. Id.
140. See id.
141. No. 1:06-CV-357, 2006 WL 5230332 (S.D. Ohio July 21, 2006). The case arose during the course of the
government's criminal investigation of Appellee, Steven Warshak, and his company Berkeley Premium Nu-
traceuticals, Inc. Id. at '2. During the government's investigation, it utilized two separate ex parte orders under
18 U.S.C. § 2703(d) to compel Warshak's Internet Service Providers ("ISPs") to disclose all stored content and
account information from Warshak's e-mail accounts. Id. at *1-2. In both instances, a judge issued a 2703(d)
order after the government met the low burden of stating "specific and articulable facts" showing reasonable
grounds to believe that the information sought was "relevant and material to an ongoing criminal investiga-
tion" of the defendant. Id. at *3. Simultaneously, the government utilized another ECPA provision to delay
notification of the disclosure to Warshak for a period of ninety days. Id. The delayed notification provision was
authorized upon the government's claim that notice to Warshak of the disclosures would "seriously jeopardize"
the criminal investigation. Id. The 2703(d) orders were issued under seal, preventing Warshak's ISPs from
informing him of existence of the order, the investigation against him, or disclosure itself. Id. Over a year later
and without any renewals of the ninety day delayed notification period, Warshak was finally notified of the
2703(d) orders which compelled his ISPs to turn over the contents of his e-mail accounts. Id. Subsequently
Warshak filed a complaint against the United States in the District Court for the Southern District of Ohio
alleging that the compelled disclosure of his e-mail without a probable cause warrant violated his Fourth
Amendment rights. Id. at *4.
142. Id. at *1.
143. Id. at *7.
144. Id.
145. Id. at *8.
146. Id.
147. Id.
148. Id. (citing United States v. Van Leeuwen, 397 U.S 249, 251 (1970)).
149. Id.
150. Id. at *9.
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ceed on the merits of his Fourth Amendment claim.' While recognizing that
"emails [sic] sent through and stored on the servers of commercial ISPs are obvi-
ously distinguishable in many respects from both sealed letters and postcards phys-
ically mailed via public or private carrier," 52 the district court hung its hat on the
similarities between letters and e-mails.
III. DISSECTING THE COMPARISONS
The aforementioned courts are correct in identifying that e-mails and text messages
are similar to other forms of communication.'53 In fact, telephones, cellular phones,
voice-mail, postal mail, text messaging, and e-mail share a common goal-to create
a communication network. 4 All communication networks send and receive two
types of information: content information and envelope information.'55 Content
information refers to the contents of the communicated message whereas envelope
information is a type of non-content information which is used to deliver the mes-
sage to its intended recipient. 6 For example, the mail system operates on these
principles: content information refers to the message intended for the recipient (the
letter inside the envelope)'57 and envelope information refers to the addressing in-
formation used by postal officials to direct the mail to its intended recipient (the
name, street address, and postal zip code).'58 Although the analogies between new
forms of communication-such as e-mail, and letters or telephone calls-appear
straightforward, significant distinctions exist between the mediums.5 9 Primarily,
these distinctions involve differences with regard to whom the message is disclosed
and what information is disclosed. 6 These differences are especially important in
determining the "reasonableness" of an expectation of privacy. Failure to examine
the technical differences between the communications renders any "reasonable ex-
pectation" analysis incomplete. As an example, the next section will briefly explain
151. Id. at *11.
152. Id. at *9.
153. See, e.g., United States v. Maxwell, 45 M.J. 406, 417-18 (C.A.A.F. 1996) (stating that "[el-mail trans-
missions are not unlike other forms of modern communication"); see also O'Neil, supra note 9, at 36. VoIP uses
a data network to transmit a telephone call over the internet in a digital format. Id. The information is repli-
cated from one router to another until it arrives at the recipient's telephone, leaving a data trail indefinitely in
cyberspace storage. Id.
154. See Orin S. Kerr, Internet Surveillance Law After the USA PATRIOT Act: The Big Brother That Isn't, 97
Nw. U. L. REV. 607, 611 (2003) ("The fundamental purpose of a communications network is to send and
receive communications.").
155. Id.; see also Johnny Gilman, Comment, Carnivore: The Uneasy Relationship Between the Fourth Amend-
ment and Electronic Surveillance of Internet Communications, 9 COMMLAw CONSPECTUS 111, 122 (2001).
156. Kerr, supra note 154, at 611.
157. Id.
158. Id.
159. See infta Part 11I.B.; see also Freiwald, supra note 3, at 4.
160. See infra Parts IV.A.-B.
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the technical operation of e-mail communications, as exemplary of emerging com-
munication networks.1 6'
A. Technological Background
E-mail is a type of digital technology network which sends envelope and content
information from one computer to another computer.162 E-mails are made up of
two types of data packets, packet headers and body packets, which are sent and
received by computers over the Internet. 163 The envelope information appears in
the packet header.' 6 The non-content information in the packet headers contains
the e-mail addresses of the sender and recipient, the addresses of the computers
(Internet Protocol addresses), and information about what type of message is at-
tached. 65 A second type of data packet, the body packet, contains the communica-
tion's message.166
Both the packet header and body packet must be revealed to the ISP to commu-
nicate and send the message.6 7 Generally speaking, the packet header and body
packets will travel separately, each taking the shortest path possible, through an
interconnected network of computers to reach their destination at the ISP server
where the packets are "reassembled."'68 During this process, the contents of the
communication travel through a series of routers operated by a multitude of differ-
ent entities and copies of the contents are left behind on third party routers which
can access the contents at a later time. 69 Because data is transferred in clear text,
the third parties with access to the communication can read them.70 When the
packets arrive at their final destination, the receiving computer will discard the
packet header and keep content information contained in the body packet. 7' The
recipient of the communication may download the message onto a local drive and
delete it from the ISP server, may read and delete the e-mail from the ISP's server,
or may retain the message on the ISP server as a backup copy.' VoIP and SMS text
161. See infra Part IlA.
162. See Kerr, supra note 154, at 613.
163. See id. at 612-14; see also Gilman, supra note 155, at 122.
164. Kerr, supra note 154, at 612-13.
165. See id. at 614.
166. See Gilman, supra note 155, at 122.
167. See Kerr, supra note 154, at 614 (stating that "while an email [sic] travels across the Internet, both the
envelope and content information of emails [sic] travel across the Internet as payloads of individual packets").
168. See U.S. Telecom Ass'n v. F.C.C., 227 F.3d 450, 464 (D.C. Cir. 2000).
169. Schneider, supra note 115, at 371. At the very least four copies of the e-mail message exist ("one each
on the sender's hard drive, the sender's service, the recipient's server, and the recipient's hard drive"). Id.; see
also Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1563 (citing OFFICE OF TECH. ASSESSMENT REPORT, U.S. CONGRESS, ELEC-
TRONIC SURVEILLANCE AND CIVIL LIBERTIES (1985)); see infra App. A.
170. Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1563.
171. Kerr, supra note 154, at 614.
172. See Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1563.
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messaging communications travel across networks in data packets in a similar
way.
173
B. Imperfect Comparisons
Despite the unique technological characteristics of new forms of electronic com-
munications, 174 courts are likely to compare the new technologies to traditional
communication networks. 175 However, courts should analyze the propriety of these
comparisons. 176 The central distinction between e-mail and its analog counterparts,
postal and telephone communications, is that electronic communications are in-
herently more vulnerable to interception than other forms of communication.'7 7
This vulnerability stems from multiple sources. 7
First, unlike letters or telephone calls which are transmitted by either the postal
service or telephone company, the e-mail travels through multiple third parties
before reaching the receiving ISP. 7 9 In contrast, letters and telephone calls pass
directly to the intermediaries who utilize the non-content envelope information to
direct the communication to its intended recipient.' Second, each of the "han-
dlers" who have access to the e-mail during transmission may access the content of
the communication. 8 ' While the intermediaries who handle letters and telephone
calls have the ability to access the content of the communication, there is a pre-
sumption that intermediaries "will not do so as a matter of course." 2 Whether
such a presumption would apply to third party handlers (rather than ISPs) who
transmit the communication, is unlikely. 3 Third, e-mails are unlike traditional
forms of communication because of their potential to exist indefinitely in multiple
173. VoIP is a technology for transmitting analog voice signals (telephone calls) into digital data that is sent
in packets over Internet protocol rather than through the traditional telephone network indistinguishable in
form from other data transmissions over the Internet. See Garrie et al., supra note 9, at 100-01, 105; see also
O'Neil, supra note 9, at 36. As data packets containing the voice communications travel through the Internet,
the data is replicated from one router to the next until it arrives at the listener's phone. Id. Consequently, a data
trail of the communication remains indefinitely. Id.
174. See infra notes 179-85 and accompanying text.
175. See Megan Connor Bertron, Note, Home is Where Your Modem Is: An Appropriate Application of Search
and Seizure Law to Electronic Mail, 34 AM. CRIM. L. REV. 163, 186 (1996).
176. Id.; see also R. Scot Hopkins & Pamela R. Reynolds, Redefining Privacy and Security in the Electronic
Communication Age: A Lawyer's Ethical Duty in the Virtual World of the Internet, 16 GEO. J. LEGAL ETHIcs 675,
683-84 (2003) (stating that simple analogy trivializes differences between e-mail and postal mail and fails to
account for differences in cyber space).
177. See Schneider, supra note 116, at 372.
178. Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1562-63.
179. See id.; infra App. A.
180. I use the term "handler" in this Comment to refer to third parties through which the data packets
travel during transmission.
181. See Schneider, supra note 116, at 374 (citing Henderson, supra note 64, at 523).
182. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 471 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.
2008).
183. See Kerr, supra note 154, at 628 (explaining how courts are likely to use the disclosure principle when
extending Fourth Amendment protections to electronic communications).
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locations.184 Unlike analog telephone conversations which are transmitted over tele-
phone lines and are ephemeral in nature, digital copies of e-mails may be stored
indefinitely by multiple third parties and by ISPs."'
IV. APPLYING KATZ TO ELECTRONIC COMMUNICATIONS
Courts should not rely on past applications of the "reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy" test to traditional communications mediums to examine Fourth Amendment
protections of new modes of communication. Instead, Katz must be re-applied and
careful attention given to the technological aspects of each communication net-
work. Particularly, courts must examine 1) if content or non-content information
is disclosed;" 6 2) to what type of third party the information has been disclosed;. 7
and 3) if the individual relinquished any expectation of privacy contractually.'
Faithfully applying Katz and the disclosure principles, courts will find that
Fourth Amendment protection generally does not exist in the new frontier of elec-
tronic communications as the law currently stands.'89 If non-content information is
revealed to any third party or intermediary, no Fourth Amendment protection will
apply to the non-content information disclosed.9 ° If content information is re-
vealed, the court must analyze whether the information is conveyed directly to an
intermediary; if so, the presumption exists that the intermediary will not disclose
the communication and Fourth Amendment protection will apply. 9' However, if
the content information is revealed to a non-intermediary third party, the disclo-
sure principle extinguishes Fourth Amendment protection.'92 Finally, if Fourth
Amendment protection has not been extinguished under the proceeding analysis, a
court must consider whether the user has acted in a manner inconsistent with a
reasonable expectation of privacy by consenting to a contract or other policy limit-
ing an otherwise reasonable expectation of privacy."'
A. What Type of Information Is Conveyed to Others
First, the court must examine what type of information has actually been conveyed
by the user by determining if non-content information or content information was
184. See Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1562.
185. Id. at 1562-63.
186. See infra Part IV.A.
187. See infra Part IV.B.
188. See infra Part V.C.
189. See infra Parts IV.A.-C.
190. See infra Part IV.A.
191. See infra Part I.B.
192. See infra Part N.B.
193. See infra Part N.C.
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conveyed.194 It is this distinction between content and non-content information
which explains the different results in Katz and Smith. 9
In Katz, the Supreme Court recognized a heightened Fourth Amendment protec-
tion for the content of telephone conversations despite the fact that the telephone
company could access the content of the conversation.'96 The Court refused to al-
low telephone users expectations of privacy in the content of their conversation to
be diminished merely by the phone company's ability to access the content of the
communication.'97 As made clear by Katz, content information receives a special
heightened protection under the Fourth Amendment.'98
The heightened protection provided to content information is distinguished
from the treatment of non-content information. Under the precedents of Smith,
Miller, and Guest v. Leis,'99 if non-content information is revealed to a third party
or intermediary, no Fourth Amendment protection will apply under the disclosure
principle."' In Smith, the Court distinguished the telephone number dialed by the
user, a type of non-content information, from the content of the telephone call at
issue in Katz, and held that the number dialed was unprotected by the Fourth
Amendment. 0 ' More recently, the United States Court of Appeals for the Sixth
Circuit adhered to this content-non-content distinction in Guest when it found that
the non-content subscriber information revealed to the ISP by the user was not
protected as the user had disclosed this non-content information to the ISP.2"2
Analyzing e-mail communications under this framework, it is clear that e-mail
discloses both content information and non-content information to intermediaries
and to third parties.20 3 Consequently, non-content, such as the "to/from" address of
the e-mail will not receive Fourth Amendment protection.2 4 However, because the
content of communications receives a heightened protection, the court must pro-
ceed to the second inquiry by analyzing the type of third party to whom the infor-
mation has been disclosed." 5
194. See Kerr, supra note 154, at 628-29.
195. See Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 470 (6th Cir. 2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir.
2008). Compare Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967), with Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735 (1979).
196. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471.
197. Smith, 442 U.S. at 746 (Stewart, J., dissenting) (discussing Katz).
198. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 471.
199. 255 F.3d 325 (6th Cir. 2001).
200. See id. at 335-36; see also Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
201. Smith, 442 U.S. at 741.
202. Guest, 255 F.3d at 335-36.
203. Kerr, supra note 154, at 614 (explaining that both content and envelope (non-content) information
must be transmitted to successfully send e-mail from sender to recipient).
204. Id. at 628; see also United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435 (1976) (finding no expectation of privacy in
bank depositor's financial records); Smith, 442 U.S. 735 (finding no expectation of privacy in the numeric
digits dialed to transmit a telephone call to a recipient).
205. See Kerr, supra note 154, at 628-29.
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B. Identity of Parties with Whom the Communication Was Disclosed-The Third
Party Doctrine
At the second level of analysis, the court must determine if content information
was revealed to an intermediary or to a non-intermediary third party.2"6 Content
information received by the general public as in Hoffa,2 °7 and intermediaries such
as the telephone company in Katz,2"' receive different Fourth Amendment treat-
ment." 9 If content information is revealed to an intermediary, the presumption
exists that the intermediary will not disclose the communication and the Fourth
Amendment will apply."' It is this presumption which permits a user to maintain
their expectation of privacy despite the technical ability of an intermediary-such
as the telephone company in Katz or the United States Postal Service-to access the
communication.'2
Katz dearly supports the proposition that disclosure of a communication to an
intermediary does not eviscerate a reasonable expectation of privacy.2 In Katz,2"'
the Supreme Court held that a telephone user maintained an expectation of privacy
against the eavesdropping of the government despite the fact that the content of the
telephone call was transmitted, and therefore disclosed, to the telephone company
intermediary.214 While, generally speaking, sharing the content of communications
with a third party would eliminate any reasonable expectation of privacy,"' the
Court recognized an exception for intermediaries.2"6 The Warshak court noted the
assumption of the risk doctrine "d[id] not necessarily apply ... to an intermediary
that merely has the ability to access the information sought by the government"
because of the shared societal expectation that the intermediary "will not do so as a
matter of course."7 Otherwise, the court found that a reasonable expectation of
206. Id.
207. See United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243, 1246 (7th Cir. 1970). Any member of the general public
could use the F.M. radio receivers to overhear conversations made from a mobile telephone. Id.
208. Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
209. Compare Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy despite that the content of the
communication being revealed), with Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (finding no expectation of privacy in cell phone
communication where the content of communication revealed to the public through radio transmission availa-
ble to anyone in the vicinity with a radio receiver).
210. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347 (finding a reasonable expectation of privacy despite that the content of the
communication was revealed to the telephone company); Warshak v. United States, 490 F.3d 455, 471 (6th Cir.
2007), vacated en banc, 532 F.3d 521 (6th Cir. 2008).
211. See supra note 210 and accompanying text.
212. See infra note 213-16 and accompanying text.
213. See Katz, 389 U.S. 347; see also Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470 ("Clearly, under Katz, the mere fact that a
communication is shared with another person does not entirely erode all expectations of privacy, because
otherwise eavesdropping would never amount to a search.").
214. Katz, 389 U.S. at 352 ("One who occupies it, shuts the door behind him, and pays the toll that permits
him to place a call is surely entitled to assume that the words he utters into the mouthpiece will not be
broadcast to the world.").
215. See supra Part I.B.1.
216. See supra notes 206-11 and accompanying text.
217. Warshak, 490 F.3d at 470-71.
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privacy would always be extinguished by virtue of an intermediary's ability to ac-
cess the content of telephone calls, content of mail, and the contents of safe deposit
boxes.2 18
However, courts have held that no reasonable expectation of privacy exists where
the individual has revealed the contents of the communication with the general
public."9 For example, in Hoffa, the court recognized that no Fourth Amendment
protection exists where information is disclosed to non-intermediary parties who
can access the content of the communication.2 In Hoffa, the court held that there
was no reasonable expectation of privacy in the content of cellular telephone com-
munications because the conversation was broadcast via radio transmission to any-
one who had a radio receiver tuned to the correct frequency.22" ' Consequently, if the
third party to whom content information is disclosed is a non-intermediary, no
Fourth Amendment protection under a Katz traditional analysis will exist.222
In the context of e-mail communication, it is clear the content of the communi-
cation is disclosed not just to the ISP, but to any handler that comes into contact
with the data packet as it travels from ISP to ISP.223 Like the cell phone conversa-
tion in Hoffa that could be accessed by any member of the general public in the
vicinity with a radio receiver,224 any third party that the communication travels
through can access or copy the contents of the communication. 5 Thus, a direct
comparison to telephone and e-mail communication overlooks an important dis-
tinction between e-mail and other forms of communication-that is, that the e-
mail is revealed, and able to be copied by any number of systems or persons
through which the communication travels.226 Under the Court's third party doc-
trine, the e-mail user has assumed the risk "in revealing his affairs to another, that
the information will be conveyed by that person to the Government."227 As in
Miller and Smith, any subjective expectation of privacy the e-mail user has in the
content of his e-mail is eviscerated because "he voluntarily turn[ed] [the communi-
cation] over to third parties."228 As one preeminent scholar has concluded, "[i] n the
Information Age, so much of what we do is recorded by third parties that the
218. Id. at 470.
219. See supra Part I.B.1.
220. See United States v. Hoffa, 436 F.2d 1243 (7th Cir. 1970) (recognizing no Fourth Amendment protec-
tion for mobile telephone conversation disclosed to all individuals in the vicinity with F.M. receivers tuned to
the proper station).
221. Id. at 1247.
222. See id.
223. See infra App. A.
224. Hoffa, 436 F.2d at 1247.
225. Mulligan, supra note 28, at 1562-63.
226. Id.
227. United States v. Miller, 425 U.S. 435, 442-43 (1976).
228. Smith v. Maryland, 442 U.S. 735, 743-44 (1979).
VOL. 4 NO. 2 2009
THE FOURTH AMENDMENT'S NEW FRONTIER
Court's third party doctrine increasingly renders the Fourth Amendment ineffec-
tive in protecting people's privacy against government information gathering." 229
C. Contractual Relinquishment as Terminating Fourth Amendment Protection
Finally, a court undertaking a Katz reasonable expectation of privacy analysis in
electronic communications must examine if the user has relinquished privacy that
may otherwise have been afforded to him by agreeing to terms or policies that
allow administrators or others to monitor, and thus access, the communications. 230
Even if the electronic communications user has not disclosed content information
to a non-intermediary party, he may nonetheless lose Fourth Amendment protec-
tion if he agrees to terms that provide for monitoring or auditing of his private
communications.
In Heckenkamp, the United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit warned
that a user's "privacy expectations may be reduced if the user is advised that infor-
mation transmitted through the network is not confidential and that the systems
administrators may monitor communications .. 231 Similarly, in United States v.
Simons the policy allowing "audit[ing], inspect[ion], and/or monitor[ing]" unwit-
tingly terminated Fourth Amendment protection. 32 Thus, users of electronic com-
munications systems must be wary of "terms and conditions" of use which may
unintentionally terminate Fourth Amendment protections. 233
V. DEVELOPING A KATZ EXCEPTION?
As the preceding Katz analysis suggests, a legitimate reasonable expectation of pri-
vacy in electronic communications is unlikely given the technological environment
in which these communications occur.2 34 However, our jurisprudence supports a
flexible Fourth Amendment doctrine, which is necessary to prevent the eroding
effect of advancing technologies which permit greater intrusions into the lives of
citizens."' Rather than stretch the current Katz test, or apply ill-suited analogies,
the Court must develop an explicit exception to its current doctrine, if privacy is to
be maintained.2 36
Although the Framers of the Constitution acted to guard citizens against govern-
ment intrusions into their "houses, papers, and effects, 2 37 the Framers could not
predict nor guard against government search and seizure of the private communi-
229. Solove, supra note 3, at 753.
230. See supra Parts I.B.1-2.
231. United States v. Heckenkamp, 482 F.3d 1142, 1147 (9th Cir. 2007).
232. United States v. Simons, 206 F.3d 392, 398 (4th Cir. 2000).
233. See supra notes 231-32 and accompanying text.
234. See supra Part IV.
235. See infra notes 247-49 and accompanying text.
236. See infra notes 250-52.
237. U.S. CONST. amend. IV.
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cation networks that developed in the 200 years since.238 When Justice Harlan an-
nounced the two pronged "reasonable expectation of privacy test," Katz was
heralded as signaling an era of broad Fourth Amendment protection. But in the
decades since its adoption, the promising future of strong Fourth Amendment pro-
tection has been weakened by the disclosure principle.25
Under Katz and the disclosure principle, users of electronic communications
networks generally do not possess reasonable expectations of privacy because of the
vulnerable technological environment through which the communications travel.24°
Because of this, users may be unable to avail themselves of Fourth Amendment
protection where government officials engage in search and seizure of their com-
munications. Consequently, the new frontier of electronic communications is a
dangerous place for users who seek privacy for their communications.24" '
However, e-mail, text messages, and VolP have undoubtedly each come to play
an important, if not vital, role in private communications in modern American
life,242 and our Fourth Amendment jurisprudence supports ensuring protection for
these forms of communications.243 Justice Brandeis's famous Olmstead dissent cau-
tioned the Court that it was its duty to develop the Amendment's flexibly, to pro-
tect against means of government intrusion into the lives of private citizens that
could be invented in the future.4 Katz reinforced the idea that technology could
not be allowed to erode expectations of privacy.24 Kyllo reaffirmed the Court's
commitment to adapting to society's changing expectations of privacy, stating in
dicta that technological advances could not be allowed to "whittle away" at society's
expectation of privacy vis-A-vis the government.246
In light of our strong jurisprudential commitment to preventing the erosion of
privacy by technological advances and the rapid pace at which communication
technologies are developed, if the electronic communications are to receive protec-
tion it must be done through the judiciary's creation of an exception to the disclo-
sure principles rather than through the legislative process.247 Developing an
238. S. REP. No. 99-541, at *2 (1986).
239. See supra Part II.B.I.
240. See supra note 178 and accompanying text; see also Kerr, supra note 154, at 629 (stating that "because
the contents of Internet communications are mixed together with envelope information and disclosed to the
ISP, it is at least possible that courts will find that Internet users cannot have a reasonable expectation of
privacy in Internet content information, much like postcards or cordless phone calls.").
241. See supra Part IV.
242. See supra note 44.
243. See supra notes 35-39, 44, 54, 57-58 and accompanying text; see also infra notes 247-49.
244. See Olmstead v. United States, 277 U.S. 438, 474 (1928) (Brandeis, J. dissenting).
245. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 352 (1967).
246. Kyllo v. United States, 533 U.S. 27, 34 (2001).
247. Legislative enactment is ill-suited to keep up with the changing landscape of electronic communica-
tions. Due to the rapid pace of electronic communications growth, legislative enactment is too static of a
method in which to create these protections. Cf United States v. McNulty (In re Askin), 47 F.3d 100, 105-06
(4th Cir. 1995), where the court concluded the legislature was the correct branch of government to develop the
application of new technologies to the Fourth Amendment:
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exception to the disclosure principles for electronic communications rather than
allowing Katz to be stretched or to applying improper analogies to traditional com-
munication networks24 will create a more honest Fourth Amendment jurispru-
dence. The exception for electronic communications must recognize, and account
for, the current impossibility of communicating through electronic communication
media without revealing a message itself to non-intermediary third parties. 49 Dis-
closure to non-intermediary third parties should not be treated as impermissible
disclosures.
CONCLUSION
Rather than analogously applying cases involving telephone or postal communica-
tions to the search and seizure of electronic communications,250 thus ignoring im-
portant technological differences in each mode of communication, 5' courts must
instead apply a reasoned analysis considering 1) the type of information revealed to
third parties; 2) the nature of the third party the information was revealed to; and
3) whether the user has agreed to contractual terms limiting his Fourth Amend-
ment rights252 in order to more faithfully adhere to traditional Fourth Amendment
reasoning in the new frontier of electronic communications.
While there are obvious similarities between these newer communications net-
works and traditional networks, 253 using conclusory comparative reasoning5  fails
to recognize important technological differences which distinguish these technolo-
gies,"' especially where the technology puts content information into the hands of
non-intermediary third parties.256 Under the Supreme Court's current third party
doctrine,5 7 such disclosures are not entitled to the protections afforded by the
Fourth Amendment. 5 Adherence to this third party doctrine establishes no rea-
sonable expectation of privacy in many forms of electronic communications.
In the fast-developing area of communications technology, courts should be cautious not to wield
the amorphous "reasonable expectation of privacy" standard.... As new technologies continue to
appear in the marketplace and outpace existing surveillance law, the primary job of evaluating their
impact on privacy rights and of updating the law must remain with the branch of government de-
signed to make such policy choices, the legislature ....
Id. at 852-53.
248. See supra Part III.
249. Schneider, supra note 115, at 376 (recognizing that the fact an electronic communications network is
structurally insecure should not be dispositive in analyzing a reasonable expectation of privacy).
250. See supra Part II.B.
251. See supra Part III.B.
252. See supra Part IV.
253. See supra notes 153-58 and accompanying text.
254. See Gore, supra note 3, at 403.
255. See supra Part III.B.
256. See supra Part I.B.
257. See supra Part I.B.1.
258. See supra Part I.B.
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Because of the current third party doctrine, if there is to be Fourth Amendment
protection for electronic communications, the Court must explicitly recognize an
exception recognizing the novel technological background of electronic
communications. 9
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